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t the entrance to the Dalit
1
 colony 
of a small village in the district of 
Chittoor, Andhra Pradesh, a rusty billboard 
partly covered in weeds and plastic 
announces that microfinance could change 
a life. A little further on, another billboard 
has been cut and reused by a family to 
reinforce the roof of a hut for animals. The 
boards conceal the names of famous 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). In the 
town nearby, most NGOs have boarded up 
for good. The same scene is playing out in 
                                                          
1
 Dalits are ex-untouchables, and the 
administration also classifies them as 
Scheduled Castes (S.C.). Dalit is a political 
category used as a generic term to unite a 
large number of ex-untouchables castes, 
whose life, work and agenda may often 
differ within and between castes. In the 
area covered in this article, the main ex-
untouchables castes are the Malas and the 
Madigas. The Malas often have better 
socio-economic conditions. 
other villages and towns across Chittoor 
district, like a cemetery of development 
activities, where the successive symbols of 
development projects are lying under the 
rubble of the business of poverty. 
Two years after what has been called “the 
crisis of microfinance in Andhra Pradesh”, 
MFIs have left the state. The successive 
waves of indebted farmers‟ suicides in 
Andhra Pradesh in the 2000s attracted 
global attention in 2010 when the media 
and social activists linked the suicides to 
microfinance. Various political parties took 
up the case and accused MFIs of being 
responsible for the suicides owing to their 
multilending activities and violent debt 
recovery methods. In October 2010, 
Andhra Pradesh‟s government passed an 
ordinance to suspend all microfinance 
activities and organizations. Surprisingly, 
A 
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the ordinance was implemented and 
became effective in little more than a day: 
people stopped making repayments and 
MFIs lost hundreds of crores
2
.  
The end of repayments also affected small 
NGOs, however, who then needed specific 
authorization to run credit activities, which 
had to be renewed annually; meanwhile 
any individual loan was subject to months 
of checks from the new credit bureau. 
These administrative policies were 
successful in discouraging and bringing 
microfinance and microcredit activities to a 
halt. By early 2013, all the MFIs and most 
of the NGOs had slowed down their 
activities or closed down in the district of 
Chittoor: staff had lost their jobs, NGO 
leaders were having to find new activities 
and the public lost a form of credit support. 
The few remaining active NGOs now 
focus on what they perceive as consensual 
social issues (orphanages, old-age 
pensions, AIDS, watersheds) and/or the 
implementation of state public schemes. 
Only the Self-Help Group model under the 
Indira Kranti Patham
3
 government 
program now continues, at a greatly 
reduced pace.  
                                                          
2
 Millions of Indian rupees. 
3
 The former microcredit and anti-poverty 
programmes (DWCRA (Development of 
Women Children in Rural Areas) and 
Velugu) have been integrated into IKP. 
It is hard to explain the AP ordinance in 
terms of state concern for the fate of small 
farmers harassed and violently abused by 
MFI credit agents, however. There have 
been cases of failures, exactions, violence 
and corruption in MFIs, but politicians‟ 
attacks on MFIs and NGOs almost 
certainly reflect structural changes in state 
and political approaches to development 
issues. Politicians‟ sudden transformation 
into the champions of financial ethics and 
morality rings false. Linking suicides to 
microfinance probably hides more than it 
reveals about contemporary changes in the 
development sector and in rural 
economies. 
This paper draws on my ethnographic 
fieldwork (2013) in the district of Chittoor, 
Andhra Pradesh, to examine how 
development actors have been interpreting 
and explaining the crisis and the changing 
relations and tensions (monetarisation, 
trust) between MFIs, NGOs and „clients‟ 
over the past twenty years.  
I will examine the implementation of 
microfinance in AP to show how the 
microfinance crisis reflects a crisis of the 
neoliberal development model based on 
money as the only way to address poverty 
and development. The AP ordinance is 
moreover part of wider political attempts 
to limit and control development actors‟ 
spheres and scopes, to ultimately silence 
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further challenges in an era of political 
clientelism and agrarian change. This as 
such highlights the complex interrelations 
between politics and market-based forms 
of development in India..  
 
The social, economic and legal 
trajectories of NGOs 
Starting in the 1990s, the state of Andhra 
Pradesh became a microcredit leader, with 
the largest number of Self-Help Groups 
(SHGs) in India. Microcredit was sustained 
by the regional Telugu Desam party and its 
leader Chandrababu Naidu, and was 
designed not only to soften the impact of 
neoliberal policies on the (working) poor, 
but also to win the votes of women. The 
structural transformations of rural 
economies and agrarian societies over the 
past 20 years have been characterized by 
intense labour circulation and insecurity, 
the rolling out of commercial GMO crops 
and costly pesticides, and the decline of 
patronage. These put farmers and the 
working poor under considerable pressure, 
as the rising inequalities in India over this 
period testified (Picherit 2012). 
NGOs played an active role in this process 
and, largely through the support of foreign 
donors (in the 1990s), credit gradually 
became one of their main programs. This 
led to the professionalization of NGOs into 
business-capitalist oriented activities and 
to rising differentiations between the 
“targeted groups” of the organizations (the 
poor with credentials, and the rest). The 
2000s saw MFI growth driven by profits, 
assessed on the sole criteria of debt 
recovery rates via any method. These 
transformations were long seen as a 
success story, whatever the consequences 
for those who had been transformed into 
clients. The microfinance business model 
based on the violence of market-based 
relations came alongside the state‟s 
development agenda, political clientelism 
and the monetarisation of social relations. 
The case of FPTC is exemplary of the 
social, economic and judicial trajectories 
of some NGOs over the past two decades. 
FPTC is based in Chittoor and best 
illustrates the move by NGOs towards 
business from the 1980s. In 1982, 
Narasimha Reddy, then in his twenties, 
entered the Indian Rural Reconstruction 
program. This training school was 
designed to encourage young people to 
found rural NGOs. After a few years of 
training in India and abroad, he started his 
own NGO in 1986 in the constituency of 
the TDP‟s leader, Chandrababu Naidu. The 
NGO was called PSP and implemented 
various programs for land and water 
conservation, forestry, awareness and skill 
development in few hamlets, and was 
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funded by national and international 
subsidies. 
In the 1990s, OXFAM managed training 
courses on the financial independence of 
NGOs in India, a concept Narasimha 
Reddy took seriously: he became 
independent in three years by shifting his 
activities to credit and saving. In 1995, to 
come into line with his main activity, he 
used the available juridical frameworks to 
transform his NGO into a Mutually Aided 
Cooperative Society – MACS. To sustain 
his organization, his first mentors (IRR) 
encouraged him to extend his financial 
activity from few to 100 hamlets in 5 sub-
districts (mandals). 
In 2003, his mentors again encouraged him 
to develop commercial credit with higher 
interest rates in urban areas of Chittoor 
district. The expansion was impressive. He 
also used various regulations to set up an 
NGO for his credit activities in the 
neighbouring states of Tamil Nadu and 
Karnataka:  
“There was huge competition with 
Spandhana, SHARE, SKS and other MFIs. 
But in a few years we reached 50 crores, 
60 crores, like that up to 100, 200 crores”. 
In 2007, to cope with the growth, he turned 
his enterprise into a NBFC, a Non Banking 
Financial Company. Growth was steady, 
with 5 to 10 crores of profit annually up to 
2010. But capitalization was low and fresh 
investors were needed. However, beyond 
economic motives, the social background 
of NGO leaders turned-businessmen had 
its importance: 
“The activity was expanding so drastically 
that it required a professional approach 
for the future, from Human Resources to 
planning. More than 600 staff. As you 
know, I have an NGO background and to 
some extent only I can control with my 
people”. 
Finally he opted for a group of private 
investors, who took the majority stake and 
full management decisions in the 
companies they invested in (across all 
sectors). Narsimha Reddy sold his share in 
October 2010, a week before the A.P. 
ordinance was passed:  
“In a month, microfinance collapsed and 
we lost 60 crores”. 
As Reddy had always been the manager, 
he had no choice but to go through 
corporate restructuring. 
The history of this NGO dovetails with 
most of the transformations in the 
development sector of the past thirty years. 
Staff professionalization, the end of 
foreign subsidies in the 2000s, and 
dramatic growth are some of the key 
drivers behind the juridical and 
administrative changes his organization 
underwent. 
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Once debt recovery rates became 
the alpha and the omega of the business, 
the myths of the 1990s stood little chance. 
Hopes have crashed down for microfinance 
to be the solution to end poverty, to 
empower women, transform the poor into 
successful entrepreneurs, generate 
sustainable employment, foster education 
and awareness, and more through access to 
financial services. Everyday market-based 
relations took their place, with their own 
forms of violence. 
This process has also affected smaller 
NGOs which took some of the same steps. 
As Kumar, a former NGO leader, points 
out:  
“At this time, a one page-project with 
microcredit was enough to get lahks of 
rupees from funding agencies”.  
When foreign donors started to shift their 
activities from south to north India at the 
turn of the 2000s, many NGOs focused on 
microcredit, which they viewed as the only 
way to maintain the social programs and 
their staff.  
“Otherwise how could we pay the staff?”  
Many socially oriented activities were 
reduced, however: 
“We were just like a bank, we had to 
recruit English speaking staff to write 
reports and apply for more money. Those 
educated people don’t want to go to 
villages and are unconcerned by the 
education of the poor or empowerment”. 
NGO staffs‟ new working cultures and 
their increasing administrative workload 
deeply affected their relations with poor 
people, who became their clients. As Raju, 
a former NGO leader, discusses, these 
everyday changes became starkly apparent 
when the AP ordinance was passed and 
NGOs could no longer go to collect the 
money from the villages: 
 “We are now bonded to the people, agents 
refuse to go to villages, but we still have to 
repay the funders. How can we do that?” 
While the losses have been huge for the 
MFIs, the situation is critical for small 
NGOs, as the government is using 
administrative barriers to hamper any NGO 
microcredit involvement.  
This situation has led to strong NGO 
criticism of the politicians and the state: 
“They have killed us. Since when does the 
government care about people? Since 
when have politicians been interested in 
farmers?” comments Govindappa, an NGO 
leader. 
 
Politics, microfinance and 
development schemes 
In the 2000s, NGO and MFI practices 
gradually came under attack from local 
political leaders, state employees (who 
were accused of being “inefficient 
Research and Policy Briefs                6 
 
 
bureaucrats” by “arrogant” MFI leaders), 
but also from the developmental agenda of 
the state and its various schemes. 
From the DWCRA of the 1980s, to the 
1990s‟ neoliberal version of the SHG 
under Chandrababu Naidu, politicians have 
always used such schemes to gain electoral 
favours. SHG members are mobilized as a 
direct and flexible way to influence the 
public through political meetings, women‟s 
empowerment, public health campaigns or 
via any other social issue. SHGs are locked 
into village power relations and local 
leaders maintain a stronghold over those 
groups. MFI leaders see this as the 
weakness of SHGs: 
“During the elections, repayment rates go 
down because leaders ask to postpone in 
order to get votes. Everything depends on 
who is collecting the money and we were 
successful. We had money and the people 
enjoyed our services, so politicians were 
afraid that we might play a role in 
politics”. 
This objection points to the importance of 
politics but also to the social relations 
within the economics. MFIs pride 
themselves in getting high repayment rates 
whatever the local context, an ideological 
stance some NGO leaders have criticized:  
“MFIs had no limits, they were all 
competing: how many people do you 
cover? What is your quote rate? were the 
only issues. The leaders did not want to 
know about anything else than 100% 
repayment. So credit agents even stopped 
some funerals to force the family to repay 
the debts”. 
Such competition led to multiple lending 
and weekly repayments to credit agents 
coming from outside the village‟s social 
network: Narasimha Reddy concedes that 
“there might be some excess here and 
there”, clearly being reluctant to critically 
assess his role. 
Criticisms of the NGOs who took part of 
the same path focus less on violence than 
its morality. Such organizations claim to be 
locally integrated, and to offer flexibility 
and repayment schedule negotiations. The 
violence however mixes patronage, the 
sexual harassment of women, honor, and 
prestige threats with market-based 
relations, stressing the monetarization of 
social relations.  
Some MFI and NGO leaders claim that the 
huge flows of money, the lifestyle and 
salaries of some microfinance leaders and 
in a few cases, their political ambitions, as 
well as MFIs‟ growing independence, 
began to irritate many political leaders. 
Narasimha Reddy argues that the influence 
of the World Bank was decisive for the 
government:  
“The state cannot renew its grants from the 
World Bank with its low records of SHGs 
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and their main argument is that as long as 
IMFs are successful we cannot move 
forward”. 
The AP ordinance cannot however be 
taken in isolation from the state and its 
development schemes. In the 2000s, 
growing numbers of schemes were created 
to address issues considered to be NGO 
areas. As a key tool at election times, 
schemes are the flagship of political 
parties, and are often delivered to the poor 
(the so-called “beneficiaries”) in the name 
of a political leader. Any criticism of a 
program or its implementation takes on 
local political overtones. From the 2000s, 
the TDP started to harass NGOs, and 
Congress from 2004, as Venkatamma, the 
head of a Dalit NGO, discusses: 
“They used to come to my office to threaten 
me, telling me that we should not do this 
and that, otherwise we would not have 
support anymore”. 
The government moreover increased the 
restrictions (and the threats) for delivering 
the crucial Foreign Control Regulation Act 
(FCRA), which was a very effective way 
to silence NGOs. In Andhra Pradesh, 667 
NGOs lost their license in July 2012
4
 (as 
                                                          
4
 
http://mha.nic.in/fcraweb/fc8_cancel_quer
y.aspx 
opposed to 289 in Karnataka and 110 in 
Rajasthan) and 54 in Chittoor district
5
.  
In this context, powerful local and state 
leaders were key in silencing NGOs, by 
refusing any sit-ins or other public 
demonstrations and by publicly 
disregarding the works of the NGOs. As 
such, politicians played a very active role 
in banning microfinance. In the days 
following the ordinance, Chandrababu 
Naidu, the former CM, appeared on 
television to urge people to throw their 
sandals at credit agents. Local politicians 
quickly announced the end of repayments 
to village residents. 
Public schemes, a lack of foreign subsidies 
and political pressures have radically 
changed the development landscape and 
entrenched divisions between 
organisations, who failed to stay united: 
“We had regular meetings between the 
NGOs of Chittoor but this gradually 
vanished and there were more and more 
conflicts between NGOs and leaders” 
recalls  Venkatamma. 
The development sector in the district is 
highly fragmented by caste, class and 
ideologies: Dalit (ex-untouchables) NGOs 
and trade unions faced internal tensions 
between Malas and Madigas, which were 
                                                          
5
 Interestingly, Tamil Nadu, where there 
were NGO-led protests against an atomic 
power plant, was the most heavily affected, 
with 794 cancellations. 
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sustained by political movements 
dedicated to a caste of ex-untouchables in 
conflict with the other
6
. 
 
No future? 
The microfinance crisis is part of a broader 
movement to control the activities of 
private development organizations as a 
whole, and to constrain their spheres of 
intervention to the implementation of state 
programs. The ordinance had a 
considerable impact on the ways MFIs and 
NGOs envisage the future: all the 
development actors I met only spoke about 
the past! 
While a few MFIs are awaiting the 
upcoming elections in 2014 and hope for a 
cancellation of the ordinance, they 
maintain a capitalist viewpoint as regards 
the economic crisis and the role of the 
state. Unsurprisingly, they contrast state 
bureaucracy with the financial culture and 
efficiency of microfinance, and also view 
the crisis as a regulation by the market 
itself:   
“To start again would be a challenge. After 
two years, clients have disappeared or 
have been spoiled; this is the culture here 
to postpone the repayments if no one 
                                                          
6
  The Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi 
(MRPS), known as Dandora, is fighting 
Malas for a greater share of the Scheduled 
Castes quota in public sectors (schools, 
administration...). 
comes; it would take another year just to 
instigate again this culture of repayment. 
But only the best have survived so that 
could be faster.” 
Microfinance is however driven by the 
central question of how to make a profit 
from poor people. The „best‟ MFIs are 
those that are keenest to increase their 
lending and that are prepared to use the 
most violent forms of repayment to ensure 
100% recovery rates. Only the biggest 
were able to survive, through lucrative 
business in other states with varying 
degrees of legality. A recent scam has 
again highlighted this. Of the 500 crores of 
rupees allocated to a government scheme 
for waivering loans for farmers with less 
than two hectares of land, 150 crores have 
been siphoned off by a nexus of banks and 
MFIs, and the beneficiaries have mostly 
been big farmers. 
Smaller NGOs avoid taking responsibility 
for the situation, criticising the poor for 
behaving like „clients‟, which is however 
simply a reflection of the monetarisation of 
social relations these very NGOs put in 
place. NGOs are rewriting the past with the 
myth of trust relationships between NGOs 
and the poor, and are insisting that there is 
a difference between the capitalist 
practices of the MFIs responsible for the 
crisis, and the moral economy on which 
their activities were supposedly grounded: 
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 “We helped them for years and then they 
stopped repaying and treated us without 
respect. Since we have no projects, they 
left us. So we can only work as 
subcontractors for the government which 
uses our NGO as cheap labour. No 
pensions, nothing. NGOs are all finished 
now.” 
This only highlights the reticence of the 
public towards NGO paternalism and the 
gap between NGOs and the working poor‟s 
expectations. NGOs too adopted elements 
of neoliberal terminology to receive 
funding. They spoke of the livelihoods of 
“clients” and “beneficiaries”, to project an 
image of the poor as responsible, dynamic, 
consumerist and entrepreneurial. Class 
relations and power struggles were 
ignored. 
Unsurprisingly, the rising monetarisation 
of social relations has led to the 
development of instrumental relations 
between “clients” and NGOs. From the 
start of the crisis, the public discarded 
NGOs, which could no longer sustain 
social activities, turning instead to small 
local musclemen and leaders who were in a 
position to support them effectively, 
whatever their ideology, with applying for 
credit or accessing development schemes. 
If MFIs have fully separated off their 
financial activities from their social goals, 
NGOs have also failed to address the 
indebtedness of labourers in relation to the 
increasing insecurities of labour markets 
and agriculture over the past ten years 
(Taylor, 2011; Guérin et al. 2012). The 
crisis of microfinance is one of the 
neoliberal models of development, where 
money is the main focus of development 
programs. The poor are chosen, quantified 
and categorized in terms of their capacity 
to borrow and repay, while women‟s 
empowerment is reduced to a financial 
equation. Despite huge MFI interest rates, 
the suicides, violent money collection 
methods and forced multiple lending, some 
economists (see for instance Banerjee & 
Duflo 2011: 175) still maintain that 
government was responsible for the 
microfinance crisis. They continue to see 
the market as the solution (assessed by 
their “economic” trials on the poor), which 
would guarantee profits for MFI leaders 
and stakeholders through the business of 
poverty, but limit profits for women 
(Garikapati 2008). Out of clientelism, state 
and politics have halted an activity sold all 
over the world by the gurus of „social 
business‟ as the solution to make poverty 
history. For the working poor however, the 
situation proves that financial activities for 
the working poor have to be closely linked 
to improved wages, rights and changes in 
power relations. 
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